percent to 30 percent of the population (which is in itself quite remarkable), this simply has been a return to the inequity profiles of two decades earlier. 5 The Chilean structural transformation has been guided and justified by a set of ideological and normative orientations-a radical transformation or counterrevolution in economic thinking. The dominant policy paradigm shifted drastically between the 1960s and the 1980s from structuralism to monetarism and from economic nationalism with a mixed economy to unbridled and transnationalized neoliberalism (Edwards, 1985 : 223-254, 451-461). These ideas emanated largely from the Faculty of Economics of the Catholic University in Santiago (and its intellectual mentors in the West) and have become hegemonic in professional and in policy-making circles. Friedman, von Hayek, Harberger, and the so-called Chicago School (Silva, 1991) have eclipsed the once influential UN Economic Commission for Latin America, becoming the uncontested ideological matrix of economic policy. The Chilean economy is far more internationalized and penetrated today than under the aegis of the Keynesian scheme adopted since the 1930s by all Chilean governments (Stallings, 1978: 5) .
Yet the fact remains that many of the interventionist features of Chile's past development policies in fact facilitated some of today's economic accomplishments. Along with the Asian newly industrialized countries, Chile before Pinochet had a strong and relatively effective state sector (including the military), decades of government-induced development efforts, public investment in education and human resource development, competent analysis and forecasting, a skilled labor force, and prior structural reforms (Ascher, 1975; Nef, 1990: 352-384 ). All these initial-stage features played a major role in economic modernization. More than the neoliberal project, contingency and macroeconomic planning and various forms of interventionism were crucial in the post-1986 reactivation by the military regime (La Epoca, April 17, 1991). The earlier "savage capitalism" of the Chicago Boys catastrophically imploded in the 1982-1985 recession, with double-digit rates of decline. Most important, without an authoritarian regime providing the brute force for such experimentation, the painful adjustments would have been nearly impossible to implement (Sheahan, 1987: 234) .
One remarkable and praised feature of Chile's development has been the dynamism of its agricultural and resource sectors (Dfaz and Korovkin, 1990). Since the coup and the undoing of the most populist and redistributive features of the Frei and Allende administrations' agrarian reforms, a thorough agrarian counterrevolution has been under way. Rapid technology diffusion, capitalization, and internationalization of agriculture, leading to export substitution, have taken place. Nontraditional products account for nearly one-third of all exports, second after copper, Chile's "master wedge." The Green Revolution with neoliberalism in the countryside has facilitated the emergence of new social fractions and the transformation of old ones. A "rural bourgeoisie" and a seasonal rural "semiproletariat" have emerged. Old latifundistas have mutated into a "modem" agribusiness class, strengthening their already substantial historical linkages with finance capital. Meanwhile, the bulk of the peasantry has lost its access to land (through indebtedness or productive marginalization), becoming instead a new type of seasonal wage earners. The vertical integration of production and the steady decline of farm workers' incomes are at the core of such agricultural modernization. The prosperity of the few has been financed by the impoverishment of the many, assisted by state repression and antilabor legislation. A similar pattern has emerged in forestry and fisheries. The latter's increased technification and vertical integration in production, processing, commercialization, and distribution-even more so than in industry and agriculture-have led to nearmonopoly situations. As in the other sectors, accumulation is heavily dependent upon reserves of cheap, abundant, and nonunionized labor: the low-wage economy.
POPULAR DISARTICULATION AND ELITE REARTICULATION
Privatization, denationalization, and deindustrialization have also been important structural features of the new order. Many industries under the Corporaci6n de Fomento de la Producci6n (National Development Corporation-CORFO), established in 1939, have been transferred from the public to the private sector, while other establishments have been sold to foreign investors or simply disappeared. The alteration of the rules of the socioeconomic game has had implications for the very foundations of Chile's patterns of social relations. One intended and enduring effect of the policies applied by the military regime has been the drastic undermining of the social and economic basis of Chile's blue-collar workers (Martinez and Tironi, 1983 : 241-243; Leyva and Petras, 1986: 4-21) . A precariously employed working class ceases to be an important political actor when its own numbers dwindle. To that one must add the conscious attempt at crippling the political mechanisms of collective bargaining-unions and labor confederations-as with the Plan Laboral of 1979. Thus not only are workers extremely poorly represented compared with the pre-1973 period but their strength as a social force has declined. Since the military takeover, blue-collar organizations have been seriously weakened and fragmented both in numbers and in strength.
Labor disarticulation has affected the largest national organization, the Central Unitaria de Trabajadores (Workers' Unitary Central-CUT), which in the 1990s had an estimated membership of slightly over 400,000 and more than 70 affiliated organizations. Although the CUT has the same acronym as the once-powerful, left-wing and militant Central Unica de Trabajadores, banned in 1973, it is a pale ghost of Chile's labor past. According to estimates, in 1990s the CUT effectively represented only about 17 percent of organized labor and 4 percent of the total labor force.6 Competing with the CUT there are other, more conservative organizations. The second-largest, the Central Democratica de Trabajadores7 (Worker's Democratic Central-CTD), is strongly anticommunist and affiliated with an AFL-CIO-controlled inter-American confederation. Also, there are smaller and ideologically corporatist front groups such as Central General de Trabajadores (Workers' General Central-CGT) and the Frente Nacional de Organizaciones Aut6nomas (National Front of Autonomous Organizations), both headed by figures close to the military regime.
A structural consequence of economic restructuring is the growing number of informales, who are only loosely and in a fragmentary fashion integrated into the job market and have very limited capacity to bargain, organize, and mobilize. Many of the existing industries are informal (that is, they do not conform to the norms contained in safety, health, labor, or environmental regulations) and employ cheaper, nonunion workers. Also, many of the large formal industries subcontract with informal suppliers. All this helps to keep wages exceedingly low, thus allowing hefty increases in business profitability, vertical integration of capital and production, and international competitiveness.
Departing from a long historical trend, since 1973 the public sector has been effectively reduced as far as its social, health, educational, housing, and economic functions are concerned (U.S. Department of the Army, 1982: 150-151). Many of these activities were privatized and transferred-at discount prices-to a business sector made up of the most conspicuous constituents of the military regime. Subsequently, transnational insurance companies, in alliance with domestic capital, established firm control over the bulk of pension funds, health insurance, and the like. This massive transfer of public monies to private hands occurred with hardly any real accountability (CEPAL, 1985: 99-133).8 In practice, and leaving aside euphemisms (Santamaria, 1992 : 39-51), it was largely an expropriation by the financial system of the social savings of workers and employees. Notably, the only exception to this privatizing fever was the social and health services of the armed forces. Their social security funds have retained their autonomy and protection under state authority-which is paradoxical given the alleged "efficiency" of the reforms imposed upon Chile's blue-and white-collar workers. In addition, taxes for high-income earners were reduced and made increasingly regressive. Entire sections of the public sector were eliminated and many activities transferred to local and regional jurisdictions such as municipalities, then under the control of appointed mayors and unelected municipal development boards, as part of a supposedly "decentralizing" scheme. The net effect of these administrative reforms was to take the traditional decision-making power away from the civilian techno-bureaucracy and concentrate it in a presidential entourage of advisers, trusted allies, and the military. Since the redemocratization of local government in 1992, local politics has emerged anew but retained the sinecures and enclaves inherited from the previous regime largely intact.
With the shrinking of the state's economic and welfare functions there has been a virtual disintegration of the traditional white-collar bureaucratic and professional middle classes, which once played an important "brokerage" and moderating role in the policy-making process. In fact, as Valenzuela (1977: 155-230) has argued, the distinctive democratic style of pre-coup Chilean politics rested upon the institutionalization of class conflicts through political and bureaucratic bargaining mechanisms. This "state of compromise," already strained by the catastrophic polarization of 1970-1973, was purposely eradicated by the military regime, whose "war on politics" was essentially geared to the demolition of this particular form of entrenched republican lifestyle.
In addition to the forced constriction of the productive (i.e., state corporations) and administrative apparatus of the state, with its political bargaining and patronage, the financial and cultural foundations of Chile's middle classes were deliberately undermined. The aforementioned privatization of social security funds cut deeply into old-age security, health care, credit, and housing: the economic safety nets of all white-collar empleados. Another blow to the middle sectors was the dismemberment and privatization of education. Until 1973, Chile exhibited a high-quality (and generally free and accessible) public education system, reputedly one of the best in Latin America. With the transfer of the national public educational system to the municipalities (headed then by military-appointed mayors), both the quality of education and the economic status of schoolteachers (another important segment of the middle classes) declined considerably. Instead, and in sharp discontinuity with the past, quality education was made accessible exclusively to those able to pay for it. In the same vein, university education was so distorted by political intervention, forced closures, induced fragmentation, arbitrary firings, and the hiring of politically reliable personnel and military rectors as to leave it virtually in shambles. Especially affected in this anti-intellectual crusade was the once highly prestigious University of Chile, traditionally the cradle of the country's professional middle classes (Nef, 2001: 15-21) .
In contrast to the fragmentation of blue-and white-collar labor, the already strong business class has become even stronger. The all-encompassing umbrella organization is the Confederaci6n Nacional de la Producci6n y del Comercio (National Confederation of Production and Commerce-CNPC), established in 1932. It articulates a distinctively neoliberal discourse with corporatist overtones and includes in its membership all the major "functional" economic associations in agriculture, industry, mining, construction, commerce, banking, and the stock exchange.9 In addition, there are a number of autonomous employers' organizations outside the formal umbrella of the CNPC, though more or less sharing its goals and ideology. These have included the Confederation of Guilds and Federations of Chilean Farmers, the Confederation of Retailers, the Truck-Owners' Confederation, and the National United Confederation of Small and Mid-Sized Industry, Services, and Artisans. By and large these business organizations, whether autonomously or in association with the CNPC, are organically linked to both rightwing parties: Renovacion Nacional (National Renovation-RN) and the more extreme, authoritarian and corporatist Union Democratica Independiente (Independent Democratic Union-UDI).
The major mouthpiece for business interests is Chile's national newspaper and dominant newspaper chain, El Mercurio. It is closely connected to neoliberal, corporatist, and authoritarian personalities in the military regime, having been for more than a century Chile's principal mechanism for the molding of public opinion and the construction of the elites' hegemonic discourse. The major business associations become exceedingly powerful not only in relative but also in absolute terms. Their size, financing, organization, interlocking capacity, representation in official government agencies, control over the media, internationalization, and ability to determine the intellectual agendas of universities have made them, for the first time in Chilean history, a hegemonic business class stronger than the state. The officer caste, which is the most important part of the state, has been symbiotically aligned with business in an entangling alliance that includes important constituencies from the U.S. military and economic elite.
THE CHILEAN STATE: NEOCORPORATISM AND RECEIVERSHIP
Neoliberalism has been the blueprint both for the economy and for the social context in which economic life takes place. However, the intellectuals espousing these ideas could not by themselves have influenced the course of Chile's development in the absence of certain induced political conditions and external supports. In the feverish climate following the 1973 coup, with economic nationalists and Keynesian structuralists on the run and the business community in search of a new slogan, it was easy for neoliberals and monetarists to gain the upper hand. While neoliberalism and national security appeared antagonistic at first, there are axiological and-most important-deontological compatibilities. The convergence of these antipopular and antidemocratic tendencies has been greatly facilitated by the ideological intermediation provided by Catholic, corporatist integralist thinking in integrating the discourses of the other allied groups of the elite revolt, namely, the capitalist class and the military. In fact, integralism supplied the bridge between national security, with its statist and authoritarian tendencies, and economic liberalism, with its claim to economic "freedom." A "liberalconservative fusion" emerged (Cristi and Ruiz, 1990) as different fractions of the ruling class coalesced in accepting an ideological construction that justified their interests. This grafting of neoliberalism onto "reactionary modernism" and "national security" was the fundamental task of the regime's main ideologue, Jaime Guzman. The authoritarian-capitalist state outlined by the 1980 Constitution involves an amalgam of economic neoliberalism (a la von Hayek or Friedman), Catholic and corporatist integralism in the social sphere, and national security in the political realm. The latter in particular has privileged a vertical and highly repressive view of the political process. Being the dominant ideology of the security establishment, it has influenced officials' views on "internal warfare," human rights, dissent, and the "appropriate response" to conflict management.
THE MILITARY AS SHADOW GOVERNMENT
With the carefully orchestrated transition, the armed forces not only retained but also entrenched their presence and status in society, maintaining and expanding the economic and cultural foundations for their reproduction as a social group. In fact, they made themselves the best-organized and most recognizable component of the upper-middle class as the protectors of an elitist and vertically structured socioeconomic order. In this sense, they constituted themselves into a surrogate political class as well as a surrogate middle class. They also radically changed their status in society and in the political system. From a relatively lesser component of the public sector-an armed bureaucracy uncomfortably subordinated to constitutional authoritythe officers evolved not only into a virtually autonomous "state within the state" but also into the state itself (Sanchez, 1990 : 290-300). Their functions were also drastically altered (CED, 1989). From a relatively small national force largely concerned with defending the territorial sovereignty of the state against external aggression, from 1973 on, the officers mutated into a highly efficient, large and exceedingly costlyl? occupation force at war with an "internal enemy." In so doing, despite their claims to nationalism, professionalism, and "apoliticism," they became thoroughly and objectively politicized, transnationalized, and imbued with self-righteousness exclusionism Undoubtedly, Pinochet succeeded in manipulating the fears, paranoias, and anxieties present among his men and in linking his own fate with that of the military. He remained in command longer than any other army chief in Chilean history. For most of his subordinates he became both a godfather-figure or patron and a role model as a "soldier's soldier." For the officer, the institution and especially its patrimonial leader became part of a "family," linked by codes of honor, secrecy, esoteric language, and rituals often incomprehensible to outsiders. Even before the coup, since the late 1960s and early 1970s, military culture and organization in Chile, encouraged by anticommunist ideological indoctrination, had become quite fanatical, assertive, and actively interventionist. These traits have not disappeared with the "return to democracy" or the end of the cold war, nor has the command structure been modified. The army, the largest and leading sector of the armed forces, remains in the hands of the former dictator's disciples, constituting a de facto parallel government over which the elected authorities have little control. The other branches (including the police), while superficially less militant, also remain quite autonomous, almost contemptuous, vis-a-vis the constitutional government, in particular the ultraconservative navy. The governing coalition may have the votes but has little power. Instead, the "parallel government," allied with the business community, the ideological extreme right, and external constituencies, has the monopoly of force. This contradiction generates a vacuum of authority in which civil society is held hostage, suspended between "ungovernability" and the return of dictatorship. This may help to explain why the greatest difficulty faced by the elected administrations of Presidents Aylwin, Frei, and Lagos in consolidating democracy has been the handling of civic-military relations. Since December 1990, the military has uttered threats of intervention if things do not go its way. On all these occasions the government has backed down.
ROADBLOCKS TO DEMOCRACY
Beyond declining incidents of political violence attributed to the radical left,'4 Chile presents an increasing incidence of criminality. Extreme poverty, inequality, limited mobility, and the erosion of proper police activities by the previous regime are at the core of expanding lawlessness-mostly among youth-and increasing threats to personal safety. The creation of dual moral and legal standards whereby heinous crimes and corruption go uninvestigated and unpunished for reasons of "national security" and the highest court in the land protects their perpetrators has undermined public trust in the legal system. Arbitrary rule has had a devastating effect on a culture once so attached to the rule of law. "Business ethics" based upon market rationality and greed is a poor substitute for public morality.
During the national security regime, the functions, size, training, and structure of the once prestigious and effective carabineros (police) were distorted.15 The pre-and postcoup purges severely affected professionalism and the chain of command. The police force was turned into a dependency of the Ministry of Defense, its role largely that of a highly visible first line of repression. Moreover, since the military always perceived the police force as an eventual adversary in a confrontation, its numbers were deliberately reduced, rendering it ineffectual. The civilian Bureau of Investigations did not fare any better. In the resulting vacuum, criminal violence is felt everywhere. It affects the poor as well as the rich. Needless to say, the overwhelming and pervasive right-wing press seizes on these events to demonstrate that the government is "soft on terrorism" and to call for a "heavy hand." With the assassination of the authoritarian republic's main ideologue, Senator Jaime Guzman, in 1991, many attempts by the government to expose and punish human rights abuses committed during the Pinochet era came to an end. The democratic administration re-created a national civilian intelligence unit (El Mercurio, April 24, 1991; APSI, 1991b) about a year after President Aylwin had disbanded the military regime's dreaded National Information Central (CNI).
Besides authoritarian practices and enclaves, there are systemic reasons for the resilience of the current institutional setup on the part of Chile's upper strata. The structural changes of the Pinochet regime-including its economic policies-were not simply the product of the interaction of freewheeling, freely contracting parties. The "hidden hand" required a long arm. The transformations and modernizations were not imposed upon most Chileans through the mechanisms of collective bargaining, electoral processes, majority rule, or reasonable political debate, nor were they the "natural" and "rational" result of the operation of free market forces. There is another fundamental obstacle to democratic consolidation: the authoritarian-capitalist model has a significant constituency, both military and civilian. This is not only a matter of numbers. If bullets are added to ballots (something the elected government cannot do), the level of support for the authoritarian formula is more than adequate (Easton, 1968) . If anything, in the years since the coup, the right has been assisted in recovering from a catastrophic downward spiral. Conversely, the years of repression and the proscription of political activity have severely affected the political forces that depended heavily on grassroots voting.16 The political center, while holding its own, has remained largely stagnant. For the left in general, especially the more radical left, proscription has meant disaster (see Table 1 There is a "psycho-cultural" obstacle to democracy, too: the climate of uncertainty and fear cultivated by years of national-security practices. For many, even today the Allende years evoke a kind of irrational horror to be avoided at any cost. An entire generation, in fact, the bulk of the electorate, had no exposure to democracy prior to 1990.18 Antidemocratic propaganda has been, and continues to be, very clever and subliminal. There is a pervasive culture of denial in which many refuse to recognize the atrocities committed or justify them in terms of "survival" or "necessity." These people come not only from the upper and upper-middle classes but also from alienated popular sectors as well. Although those objectively favored by the Pinochet regime and its legacy are indeed greatly outnumbered by those who have experienced deprivation, ideological illusions-such as fear of "communism" or the military's monopoly on the "motherland," "the flag," or "patriotism"-play a major part in Chile's politics.
DEPENDENT TRANSITION
The limited redemocratization of 1990 is, as in many Latin American countries, conditioned by the previous process of forced de-democratization. Authoritarianism should be given at least equal credit with neoliberalism for the current economic, social, and political state of affairs, however evaluated. Moreover, the importance of external factors-chiefly the role of the U.S. government-in the transition process should not be underestimated. "Transition" here means both the more recent one between authoritarianism and democracy (1988-1990) and the previous one between democracy and authoritarianism (1969) (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) . The most talked about nowadays in official and academic circles is the former.'9 Since the 1980s, the administration in Washington has played a remarkable (but often hypocritical) role in pursuing a policy of "orderly return to democracy," with declared encouragement of respect for human rights and selective support for opposition organizations. Less discussed is the U.S. role in the 1960s and early to mid-1970s in undermining democracy. This effort involved a massive undertaking to facilitate the violent transition from a democracy with nationalist and populist overtones to a client national-security regime as part of a much more general policy of containment throughout Latin America.
This intervention was undertaken not just during the Allende years but for years before and after the coup with the training and indoctrination for military and police officers and support for right-wing intellectual think tanks. These linkage groups (Chalmers, 1972: 12) were to play a key role in the formulation and management of the authoritarian project. The most direct and intense U.S. involvement took place in the period between the election of Allende and September 11, 1973. In addition to supporting the violent opposition to Allende, the Nixon regime orchestrated massive internal disruptions of transportation and food supplies as well as a concealed international financial and trade blockade designed-in the words of Richard Nixon himself-"to make the economy scream" (U.S. Senate, 1976) . All these efforts paved the way for the coup.20 The military and other internal forces just did the "dirty work." Immediately after the overthrow of the constitutional government, credit was unblocked, grain supplies flowed back in, and economic, military, and intelligence assistance was readily available. Diplomatic cover and disinformation were also provided in order to assist in the "reconstruction" of Chile and muffle international and domestic critics. 
CONCLUSIONS: THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF COUNTERREVOLUTION
Chile presents the paradox of a legitimate government presiding over an illegitimate state with authoritarian enclaves and exceedingly weak political brokerage. The transition has been the result of a pact of elites from which most of civil society has been excluded. Moreover, the "old" regime has maintained "meta-power" (Baumgartner et al., 1976) in the negotiations by controlling and altering the rules of the game. This pact has meant basically the acceptance on the part of the democratically elected government of the constitutional, institutional, and socioeconomic order laid out by the previous regime. The Concertaci6n has had to agree from the outset to play by the rules established by Pinochet's authoritarian constitution. Moreover, it has had to accept all the "organic"22 paraconstitutional legislation passed before the regime's formal departure. This legislation conferred virtual immunity on the armed forces and the police. In addition, it established the composition of the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Tribunal, the Comptroller's Office, the Central Bank, the National Telecommunications Commission, the mayoralties of nearly 300 municipalities,23 and the university councils. It also guaranteed tenure to most of the civil servants appointed during the dictatorship and Table 1 ).
The electoral upswing of the right in 1999 points to the possibility that Joaquin Lavin's conservative Alliance for Chile, representing unabashed supporters of the former military regime, could actually gain control of the government in 2006, this time through democratic elections. This partially explains why the authoritarian opposition was finally willing to revise its stand on appointed senators and electoral procedures that gave the Pinochetista opposition a controlling interest in the formal political process. These reforms could in fact favor the right and prevent the center-left from holding a veto power once in opposition.
The nature of the current transition accounts for a kind of "constipated" consolidation whose main function is to give an aura of procedural respectability to a counterrevolutionary and antidemocratic order of things. The legacy of national insecurity left by the dictatorship is too heavy to be managed by the elected government in the short and medium term. Meanwhile, the institutional apparatus constructed by the authoritarian regime will likely remain essentially unchanged. With the end of the economic bonanza, unfulfilled demands on all fronts-human rights, economic, labor, and the poorare increasingly beyond the government's capacity to satisfy. The forces impeding much-needed democratic and socioeconomic adjustments are too entrenched and powerful to accept substantive reform. This, combined with the weakness of the historical left and the venality of the "renovated" left, narrows the range of institutional alternatives for voicing the concerns of most of those made redundant by the present model. On closer scrutiny, the intellectual software and technocratic style of Chile's current economic and social policies present remarkable continuities with those of the dictatorship (Silva, 1991: 386, 398-410). As a former finance minister of the Concertacion put it in 1991: "We may not like the government that came before us.... But they did many things right. We have inherited an economy that is an asset" (Kandell, 1991: 17-18).
Disillusionment and fragmentation are already under way beneath the seemingly unified surface of the governing alliance. This is not without precedent in Latin American countries in the latter electoral phases of transition. The Achilles' heel of Chile is today more political and social than economic; latent political violence and social unrest may become manifest and upset the "salutary" signs that the international business community finds attractive. But there are also signs of economic crisis looming on the horizon. Expansive growth peaked in 1998. Prices for some of Chile's major exports, copper, fruits, and cellulose, have declined since the mid-1990s. In the short to medium term, growth rates have been sensitive to this volatile export market, and unemployment has increased since 1994. This slump is a potential threat to the celebrated dynamism of Chile's export-driven economy, as is the overvaluation of the currency resulting from speculative growth (Soros, 1997) . Deep down, Chile is as financially fragile as Uruguay, Brazil, or Argentina.
Paradoxically, however, the main contributor to political instability in the long run is not so much the extreme left as a militant right wing and a security establishment intent on imposing its views malgre tout. The left has learned to support bourgeois democracy, but the extreme right has not. Although drastic reductions of government spending, following a continental trend of downsizing, reduced defense budgets and personnel in 1994,28 the military was still able to blackmail the weakened and isolated civil society. Using constitutional prerogatives designed to protect their institutional interests, the security forces succeeded in initiating a massive arms buildup since the late 1990s. The events of September 11,2001, have entrenched the military's grip by redeploying and relegitimating national-security doctrines. In the current configuration of forces, their role remains that of the insurance policy of last resort for the domestic and international status quo. The analysis of the Chilean model suggests that the oft-mentioned "miracle" is rife with uncertainties and signs of insecurity. Chile cannot seriously be considered a model for Latin America any more than can contemporary Mexico or Argentina. If the Chilean experience is paradigmatic in any way for the region it is in pointing to the grave problems and mounting contradictions contained in a democratic transition with neoliberal structural adjustments that lead to restricted democracies and receiver states (Nef and Bensabat, 1993) . Chile is perhaps the most successful example of this Latin American liberal-democratic hybrid at work. What is less certain is how this model objectively benefits most of its people and how sustainable it may be in the long term. 
